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Abstract. Neo-liberalism has been the dominant political–economic ideology defining 
the state and the world economy since the late 1970s. Neo-liberalism is a political–economic 
theory committed to laissez-faire market fundamentalism, a minimalist role for state inter-
vention into the economy, and free trade and open borders. The global financial crisis that 
began in 2008 challenges the neo-liberal views of the state in numerous ways. This article 
describes the rise of the neo-liberal state, the ways the global crisis created a crisis for it, and 
then how the response to it questions its legitimacy and viability. The article concludes with 
detailing the various problems with neo-liberalism, calling for a rethinking of state theory 
within a new post-global economic order.
Keywords: neo-liberalism, state, globalization, globalism, global financial crisis, poli-
tics, economics.
Introduction 
the western banking crisis that began in 2008 and the global recession produced 
as a result is an historic event on two counts. First, state intervention to save the banks, 
including the 2008 Troubled Assets Relief Fund and the 2010 Wall Street and Consumer 
Protection Act in the U.S., represented the most significant bailout and reregulation of 
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financial markets since the 1930s. Second, the state intervention undermined whatever 
remaining legitimacy there is in the intellectual foundations of neo-liberal state ideolo-
gy, setting the stage for a new vision of the world in ways that have not been seen since 
the 1930s. 
theories of the economy, state, and public administration are interrelated. as con-
ceptualizations of how markets operate change, so do theories about the role of the state 
or government in relation to economic activity. the global recession of 2008 has chal-
lenged more than a generation of beliefs about free markets and global trade, thereby 
necessitating a rethinking about the role of governments in promoting policies such as 
deregulation and privatization. This article examines the legitimacy and continued via-
bility of the neo-liberal state in a post-global world. 
1. Markets and Government 
Governments and markets are intertwined and connected in at least four ways. First, 
they represent the two dominant ways to distribute goods and services.1 except in the 
case of face-to-face barter economies, free market and government distribution of goods 
and services provide rival ways to coordinate their production and distribution. they 
do that either by decentralizing and privatizing these decisions (in the case of market 
mechanisms) or centralizing them (as with planned economies). Often these decisions 
are not dichotomized; in most societies there is a continuum or hybrid of market-govern-
ment and decentralized-centralized mechanisms that operate.
 Second, public power is necessary to create free markets. Polanyi argued that 
free markets are not architectonic. they did not just arise and develop on their own.2 
their establishment, especially during the nineteenth century in europe, was the product 
of significant uses of governmental authority and power in order to enforce the rules of 
free markets. Even Milton Friedman, a conservative free market economist from the 
U.S. who was best noted for his arguments in favour of privatization and minimal go-
vernmental intervention into the economy, conceded that public authority was needed 
to enforce the basic rules of the market place.3 Max Weber’s writings on bureaucratic 
behaviour are often read as lessons for organizational theory.4 But it should be remem-
bered that he discussed bureaucracy and authority within the context of capitalism and 
the role of the former in helping to sustain it. Modern bureaucracies and economic or-
ders, specifically capitalism, are interconnected.
1 lindblom, c. Politics and Markets: The World’s Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
2 Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.
3 Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom. chicago: university of chicago Press, 2002.
4 Weber, M. Bureaucracy. In Gerth, H. H.; Wright Mills, C. (eds.). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 196–264.
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third, governmental authority is required to address and regulate market failures, 
such as free rider problems, (negative) externalities, information asymmetries, and mo-
nopolies.5 For many economists, unregulated free markets produce problems that only 
government regulation can correct. these may be problems surrounding maintenance of 
demand,6 distributional issues, or other pathologies that impede efficiency or the ability 
of markets to react to disequilibrium.7
Fourth, government intervention may be necessary to provide public infrastructu-
re investment or insure profitability of private businesses.8 While adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations is best remembered as the first statement defending free markets and 
capitalism, the book also offers an important defense for government investment in 
basic infrastructure (roads and canals in Smith’s day and perhaps schools and telecom-
munications today) in order to sustain and support private investment.9 Moreover, James 
o’connor has argued that modern capitalist states serve two basic functions—promote 
legitimization or support for the regime and undertake activities that make it possible for 
private businesses to maintain profitability or maintain capital accumulation.10
describing these four theories of market-state connection is important for two re-
asons. one, it establishes an interdependence or connection between markets and go-
vernments (or public and private power) that is often overlooked. Two, if markets and 
government are interconnected, changes in one necessitate changes in the other.
2. The Rise of Leo-Liberalism
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed significant evolution and 
change in theories regarding the relationship of markets to the state. the most notable 
point of contrast between the two was highlighted in the ideological struggle between 
Soviet communism and American capitalism in the post-World War II (WWII) cold war 
era. the uSSR and the u.S. represented rival theories about economies and politics, 
creating a bipolar world that divided along a host of principles that extended beyond 
markets and the state. Fukuyama described the two models offered by the USSR and 
the u.S. as competing metanarratives to structure the world.11 With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and soon thereafter the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama declared 
the West (capitalism) as having won, leaving it as the lone metanarrative to order and 
structure the world.
5 cassidy, J. How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.
6 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. nY: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1964.
7 okun, a. M. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington, d.c.: Brookings institution Press, 
1975.
8 o’connor, J. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1973.
9 Smith, A. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. NY: P.F. Collier and Son Corpo-
ration, 1937.
10 o’connor, J., op. cit., p. 3–5.
11 Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man. NY: The Free Press, 2006.
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But Fukuyama was not the first to describe the end of history or the triumph of 
capitalism. During the 1950s, American sociologist Daniel Bell wrote of the end of ide-
ology.12 Capitalism won and those in the West had figured out how to live the good life. 
The question was not about ideology only technique; not the ends but only the means to 
secure the good life.
The conclusions reached by Fukuyama and Bell were rooted in the belief that the 
post-WWii rising prosperity of the u.S. was a proof of it superiority. this prosperity, 
based on liberal-democratic political values and Keynesian economic theory, placed 
western governments at the commanding heights’ of the economy.13 this model of the 
state and public administration included regulation of the many aspects of the economy, 
a social welfare safety net, limited economic redistributions though transfer payments, 
and use of government investments and purchasing power to stimulate demand.
But the 1970s shook the foundations of the post-WWII political economic order of 
the capitalist West. A combination of high unemployment and inflation produced what 
James O’Connor argued was a fiscal crisis of the state. For O’Connor, the ‘tendency for 
government expenditures to outrace revenues’ is what he calls the fiscal crisis of the sta-
te.14 the reason for this crisis is rooted in contending class interests that make demands 
upon the state, necessitating that the government perform two mutually contradictory 
functions. The first, the accumulation function, demands that the state create the conditi-
ons that help maximize the accumulation of private profits. Accumulation is articulated 
on behalf of one class, and it involves socializing certain investment costs or making 
other expenditures or purchases that increase profitability. While the government may 
be pressured into increasing spending or cutting expenditures to maintain profit accumu-
lation, this profit is not socially consumed by is retained by businesses.
While the state is pressured to support business profitability, there is a contradic-
tory demand to make some expenses, such as for welfare, in order to maintain social 
harmony and peace among unemployed workers. o’connor sees expenditures for this 
purpose as fulfilling a legitimation function.15 From capital’s perspective, legitimation 
expenditures are not productive; they are simply expenditures to purchase peace.
O’Connor contended that the capitalist state faced a short and long-term fiscal crisis 
that perhaps could not be remedied. Yet the rise of thatcherism and Reaganism as a 
response to the legitimacy and solvency of the post-WWii order provided one avenue 
to addressing the fiscal crisis. Their solution was to shed many core state functions 
that would reduce expenditures. This was a privatization strategy. But additionally they 
advocated deregulation, a cutting back of the social welfare system, an anti-union stra-
tegy, and tax cuts. the combination of all these were meant to cut expenses businesses 
had to burden, thereby increasing their profitability and mitigating the fiscal crisis.
12 Bell, d. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, with “The Resumption of 
History in the New Century.” cambridge: Harvard university Press, 2000.
13 Yergin, D.; Stanislaw, D. The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy. NY: The Free 
Press, 2002.
14 o’connor, J., supra note 8, p. 2.
15 Ibid., p. 6–7.
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the apparent and temporary resurgence of the u.S. and uK economies led many 
to believe that the strategy had worked. their economic resurgence, along with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of european communism, and the apparent triumph of 
capitalism led some to conclude that the West had won, liberalism had vanquished all 
it foes, and the end of history had arrived. it is out of these twin events that the core of 
neo-liberalism emerged, along with a theory of public administration.
3. Neo-Liberalism 
Neo-liberalism is a political economic theory committed to the laissez-faire mar-
ket fundamentalism ideology that traces back to adam Smith and david Ricardo.16 it 
includes a belief in comparative advantage, a minimalist state, and market freedom, and 
is, as articulated in the 1990s and 2000s, driven by finance capital. At the state level, 
neo-liberalism defines a theory of public administration. If neo-liberalism includes a 
commitment to market fundamentalism, then that also means that it is dedicated to a 
politics of limited government. This includes privatization, deregulation, and a scaling 
back of many traditional functions that capitalist and communist states had performed 
since at least WWii.
As a theory of the state, neo-liberalism dictated specific roles for government offi-
cials. It meant, in the case of privatization, that managers would either become contract 
administrators who oversaw previously performed state functions now being delivered 
by private actors, or they would be in charge of the sale of state-run businesses to private 
entities. a neo-liberal state commits managers to cut regulations or make them more 
business friendly, crafting them in ways to encourage private capital accumulation. in 
the U.S., one example of this meant the 1999 adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act which deregulated banking, and the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). One can similarly argue that the European Union (EU), especially its empha-
sis on the free flow of capital across borders, embodies many neo-liberal theories about 
trade and economics. Finally, neo-liberalism, at least in the U.S., would also facilitate 
anti-union rules and those which would make it more difficult for individuals to secure 
welfare benefits from the state.17
a neo-liberal theory of the state in the traditional capitalist West also elicited the-
ories of management such as new Public Management and Reinventing Government.18 
Both of these theories sought to import traditional private sector management theories 
stressing efficiency into the public sector. In the former communist countries, neo-libe-
ral ideology, especially during the transition period, emphasized cold shock therapy and 
16 Plant, R. The Neo-Liberal State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
17 Bluestone, B.; Harrison, B. The Great U-Turn: Corporate Re-structuring and the Polarizing of America. 
New York: Basic Books, 1990.
18 Schultz, D.; Maranto, R. The Politics of Civil Service Reform. NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1998.
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a rapid conversion from central planning to market economies that included privatizati-
on, dismantling of price supports, and rapid sell-off of state-owned industries.19
But neo-liberalism as a theory transcends the state, providing also an international 
economic theory committed to free trade and globalism. Steger distinguishes between 
two phenomena.20 He describes globalization as a social process or material process 
referring to a form of a means of production and attendant social relations to organize 
the forces of production.21 He contrasts that to globalism which is the dominant politi-
cal ideology of the day that serves neo-liberal interests. Globalism and neo-liberalism 
is best understood through the lens of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s 
work, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century.22
Friedman is not the first writer to describe the emergence of a world global eco-
nomy. Historians such as Braudel23 and Spufford24 describe its development during the 
Middle ages. Political sociologists such as Wallerstein25 discuss it in terms of the emer-
gence of a world capitalist system, and Marxists including luxembourg, Hilferding, 
and Lenin charted its rise in terms of emphasizing finance and banking. But Friedman 
is unique in terms of celebrating globalization’s emergence in terms of a neo-liberal 
globalism (in Steger’s use of the term).
Friedman sees globalization as having gone through three stages that have metap-
horically reduced the world from large to small. Version 1.0 (1492–1800) shrank the 
world from large to medium. the agent of change was brawn and it was about countries 
and muscles. Globalization 1.0 was pushed by ‘how much horsepower, windpower, 
or steampower your country had and how creatively you could deploy it’. Version 2.0 
(1800–2000) shrank the world from medium to small. It was directed by multinational 
corporations going global for markets and labour. It was first driven by falling transpor-
tation costs, and then the telecommunications revolution and then the Web. Version 3.0 
(2000–present) shrinks the world from size small to tiny and flattening the playing field. 
it is directed by individuals seeking to collaborate and compete globally and it is made 
possible by software and fiber optic networks.
Globalization Version 3.0 driven by what Friedman calls ten flatteners, such as 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the creation of Microsoft Windows, and Google. these ten 
flatteners are subject to three Convergences.26 convergence i is the ’complementary 
convergence of the ten flatteners, creating this new global playing field for multiple 
19 Åslund, a. How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy. Washington, d.c.: Peterson institute 
for International Economics, 2009; Åslund, A. How Capitalism was Built: The Transformation of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. nY: cambridge university Press, 2007.
20 Steger, M. Globalism: The New Market Ideology. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
21 Ibid., p. 3.
22 Friedman, T. The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
2005.
23 Braudel, F. Civilization and Capitalism. 3 vols. NY: Harper & Row, 1979.
24 Spufford, P. Power and Profit: The Merchant in Medieval Europe. Hong Kong: thames & Hudson, 2002.
25 Wallerstein, i. The Capitalist World-Economy. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
26 Friedman, F., op. cit., p. 176–177. 
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forms of collaboration’.27 convergence ii is the rise of business schools, it specialists, 
CEOS, and workers comfortable with and able to develop horizontal collaborations who 
developed ‘business practices and skills that would get the most out of the flat world’.28 
Convergence III is the introduction of new players—3 billion—into a new playing field 
with new processes and horizons for collaboration. Overall, the 10 flatteners and three 
Convergences are yielding a frictionless flat world.
A frictionless flat world is the world of GATT, the EU, and open borders. For 
Friedman it is one that makes it possible and easy for business and commerce to cross 
borders. The question Friedman says countries need to ask is: how flat do you want to 
be? How much friction should government remove via deregulation to make for a flat 
world?29 The line between those who are in a flat and non-flat world is the line of hope.30 
Overall, the task for governments and public administrators in globalization Version 3.0 
is to create a world that is immune to political–geographic borders. it will create a free 
flow of capital, have minimal government regulation and restrictions, and include the 
development of tax policies to enhance wealth accumulation and profit taking
Global neo-liberalism takes the theories of state and public administration found at 
the state level and expands it to the world. it encourages the creation of borderless states 
integrated into a larger national economy. thus as a theory of public administration it 
almost demands the surrender of nationality and the national interest to the service of a 
world economy. 
a central contradiction thus facing neo-liberalism is its almost anti-statist theory. 
If Friedman and Steger are correct, neo-liberalism demands that individual states both 
minimize their functions and subordinate their authority to broader global regulatory 
bodies such the World Trade Organization (WTO). For countries seeking financial bai-
louts or restructurings such as Hungary, Greece, and to lesser extents Spain, Portugal, 
and lithuania, domestic policies were dictated by the World Bank and the international 
Monetary Fund. Neo-liberalism thus demanded both a restructuring of state authority 
and effective sacrifice of sovereignty to global or trans-national entities.
4. The Crisis of the Neo-Liberal State 
From the 1990s until approximately 2006–7, neo-liberalism appeared to reign su-
preme, but now the world economic crash and the rush for state intervention suggest 
that Fukuyama and Friedman may not have been so right and the rumors of the end of 
history might be premature. neo-liberalism’s deregulation and surrender of the state to 
the market and transnational bodies created the forces that led to its own destruction.
 In the U.S., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. 
Glass-Steagall had created two classes of banks—commercial and investment. the for-
27 Friedman, F., supra note 22, p. 178.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 216.
30 Ibid., p. 376.
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mer would be barred from engaging in stock speculation and instead would be limited 
to making money generally through home and other types of loans. investment banks 
would be permitted to speculate on Wall Street. Glass-Steagall was considered a major 
banking reform; it erected a firewall to prevent the type of speculation that occurred in 
the 1920s from repeating itself, thereby protecting financial institutions and the public 
from the problems that destroyed them with the crash of 1929. Some argue that the re-
peal of this act laid the groundwork for the world economic crash of 2008 as the credit 
crisis that began in the U.S. swiftly moved to banks across the world, affecting financial 
institutions and credit across Europe, including the Russian Federation. The frictionless 
flat world that Thomas Friedman and other neo-liberals desired literally made it im-
possible to contain the financial problems from jumping across borders. Globalization 
means not just the good crosses the borders, but also the bad.
The 1999 protests in Seattle, Washington at a meeting of the WTO were an early 
warning sign of the crisis facing the neo-liberal state. Here social and political protests 
confronted Wto trade, labor, and environmental policies. But the global crash of 2008 
is challenging not just neo-liberal thought in several ways. First, the prevailing paradigm 
of government and its officials taking a minimalist approach to government regulation 
was questioned. Such tactics were not neutral but perhaps a major cause of the world 
financial meltdown. Second, the government responses to the meltdown also raise a 
challenge to public administration. Specifically, the significant public bailouts of banks 
and businesses question whether the market fundamentalism of Milton Friedman makes 
sense in light of the fact that deregulation had created the forces leading to the crash. 
Conversely, the subsequent bank bailouts implicate significant questions about the 
sustainability of such a strategy without bankrupting the state. Third, the world financial 
crisis beginning in 2007–8 raises questions about the desirability of a frictionless, flat 
world of open borders described by Thomas Friedman. Had there been in place circuit 
breakers or regulations to prevent the spread of the American financial crisis to the rest 
of the world the crash might not have occurred. Contrary to Friedman then, who argued 
that the winners of the new economy would be those inside the flat world, the real win-
ners are to be those outside of it.
taken these points together, the crisis of the neo-liberal state goes back to raising 
some fundamental questions about the role of the state in relationship to markets. are 
governments merely inferior partners in the delivery of goods and services? are they 
only regulators of economic behaviour to prevent market failures? or are they critical 
agents to construct and enforce markets and perhaps even serve as viable and necessary 
economic participants in service and goods delivery? to ask these questions is to chal-
lenge neo-liberal orthodoxy for the last 20–30 years, including the desirability of dere-
gulation, privatization, and the sell-off of state-owned enterprises. This is the challenge 
to the neo-liberal state posed by the global crash.
But another challenge neo-liberalism confronts is to ask if the current vision of 
globalization (globalism for Steger) remains a viable world economic system (in the 
way Wallerstein uses the term). Globalism has demanded significant sacrifice of state 
sovereignty to appease the demands of the Wto and Gatt, for example. Were states 
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able to articulate their own policies to protect their markets, banks, and borders, perhaps 
many of the problems that transpired across the world would not have moved from the 
u.S. and to other countries as a result of faulty and risky lending policies in one nation. 
thus one prong of the crisis of the neo-liberal economic crisis demands reinvigoration 
of state power. But conversely, a different critique of neo-liberalism is that the current 
world economic order remained too unstructured, therefore, necessitating something 
similar to global Keynesianism to save it. This at least is the contention of Stiglitz.31 
the creation of this type of Keynesianism would necessitate the establishment of world 
or transnational institutions with far more authority than states current enjoy. thus, the 
problem of neo-liberalism may be that states need to have both more and less authority 
than at present. 
another problem that faces the neo-liberal state depends on its location within a 
world economic system. the options that the u.S. has versus a country such as Hungary, 
Greece, or lithuania are very different. in the case of the u.S., its relative wealth and 
size of its economy may allow it to ignore or bypass the demands of the IMF and the 
World Bank to restructure its own domestic policies. Yet for other smaller economies 
that may not be the case. in 2010 the sovereign debt crisis in Greece forced it to make 
significant cuts to many social programs and to restructure its government bureaucracies 
in order to appease lenders. Hungary, and to some extent, Spain and Portugal faced si-
milar pressures. in the case of lithuania, it opted to cut spending and slash government 
services. in all of these cases governments had to enact policies that went contrary to 
the express demands of its population, creating a political crisis threatening the current 
ruling coalitions and defying majority preferences. neo-liberalism thus creates a demo-
cratic deficit or crisis. 
Moreover, contrary to the vision of a unipolar world lauded by globalism and the 
neo-liberals, might there still be value to regional economic or political structures, such 
as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as distinct entities? Should the EU be deve-
loping its own distinct economic policies? Even within the EU, the sacrifice of national 
economies such as Greece, Portugal, Hungary, lithuania, or others in order to sustain 
cross-national policies, appease private creditors, or protect the euro might need to be 
rethought because states are being asked to second guess the natural tendency to protect 
their people in the interest of serving broader global policies. Finally, while China recei-
ves criticism for many of its economic policies and efforts to define its own role in the 
world economy with a unique measure of state–market relations, such a practice might 
be given a second thought as an effort to readjust public administration in a new era. 
The economic crisis of 2008 prompts the question: is globalization or globalism as we 
presently know it dead and is it now necessary to envision a post-global world? if the 
answer to these questions is yes, then it is time also to think about what post-globalism 
means for neo-liberal theories of the state and the state in general.
31 Stiglitz, J. E. Globalization and its Discontents. new York: W.W. norton, 2002. 
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Conclusions 
theories of the state are inextricably connected to political economic arguments 
regarding the relationship of the state and the market. From the middle of the 1970s un-
til the emergence of the economic crisis of 2008, neo-liberalism defined a theory of the 
state that proscribed a minimalist role for it and its officials in the economy, and a subor-
dination of the national interest or the public good to global imperatives. The financial 
crisis of 2008 challenges that theory of public administration. For both the traditional 
western capitalist states and the former communist ones, the economic crisis demands a 
rethinking of roles and strategies that have dominated theories of the state of late, asking 
whether they remain viable approaches in a post-global world.
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NEOLIBERALI VALSTYBĖ POSTGLOBALIAME PASAULYJE
David Schultz
Hamlino universitetas, Verslo mokykla 
Sent Polas, Minesota, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos
Santrauka. Nuo aštuntojo dešimtmečio pabaaigos neoliberalizmas buvo dominuojanti 
valstybę ir pasaulio ekonomiką apibrėžianti politinė ekonominė ideologija. Neoliberalizmas 
yra politinė ekonominė teorija, susijusi su laissez-faire rinkos fundamentalizmu, minimaliu 
valstybės kišimusi į ekonomiką, laisva prekyba ir atviromis sienomis. 2008 m. prasidėjusi 
pasaulinė finansų krizė daugeliu aspektų tapo iššūkiu neoliberaliam požiūriui į valstybę. 
Šiame straipsnyje autorius rašo apie neoliberalios valstybės iškilimą, globalaus finansų 
nuosmukio paskatintą jos krizę bei tai, kaip atsakas į šią krizę kvestionuoja tokios valstybės 
legitimumą ir gyvybingumą. Straipsnis baigiamas neoliberalizmo problemų įvardijimu bei 
kvietimu permąstyti valstybės teoriją atsižvelgiant į postglobalią ekonominę santvarką.
Valstybės teorijos yra neatsiejamos nuo politinių argumentų apie jos ir rinkos santykį. 
Nuo aštuntojo dešimtmečio vidurio iki 2008 m. ekonominės krizės neoliberalizmo valstybės 
teorijoje valstybei ir jos pareigūnams buvo priskiriama minimalus ekonominis vaidmuo, 
o nacionalinis interesas ir viešoji gerovė buvo subordinuojami globaliems poreikiams. 
2008 m. finansų krizė tapo iššūkiu šiai viešojo administravimo teorijai. Ir tradicinėms Va-
karų kapitalistinėms vastybėms, ir buvusioms komunistinėms ekonomikoms krizė tapo aks-
tinu peržiūrėti minėtus vaidmenis ir strategijas, kuriomis paremtos valstybių teorijos, ir 
atsakyti į klausimą, ar postglobaliame pasaulyje jos tebėra perpektyvios.
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